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A Cure for Just-In-Time Scheduling

Charlotte Alexander, Anna Haley-Lock, and Nantiya Ruan, Stabilizing Low-Wage Work: Legal Remedies for Unpredictable Work Hours and Income Instability, 50 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (2015) available at SSRN.

Many readers were introduced to the concept of “just-in-time scheduling” when the New York Times explored the exhausting and chaotic work life of a Starbucks barista in August 2014. But the practice is certainly not limited to Starbucks. In response to this broader trend, groups like “OUR Walmart” are calling not only for higher wages and more full-time jobs, but for predictable and dependable scheduling, and left-leaning states and cities are beginning to mandate predictable work schedules for at least some workers. This emerging locus of advocacy and media attention is also the subject of Stabilizing Low-Wage Work, a great new article by Charlotte Alexander, Anna Haley-Lock, and Nantiya Ruan. The article analyzes comprehensively not only the problem of “just-in-time” scheduling for low-wage workers, but also the potential for either collective bargaining or state and local law to solve that problem.

Adapted from the practice of just-in-time manufacturing, just-in-time scheduling refers to the now-common practice of adjusting staffing levels in response to current conditions. While it is a problem for workers with many types of jobs, it has particularly taken hold in the service sector where, the article reports, “almost 30 percent or workers” have schedules with “variable start and end times.” Moreover, as the article shows, modern technology has made just-in-time scheduling attractive; employers can monitor and anticipate customer demand in close to real-time, sending workers home or canceling their shifts altogether if potential customers are staying home. Conversely, employers may want to call people in at a moment’s notice; this requires employees to wait by the phone, but seldom results in on-call pay. Federal law, particularly the Fair Labor Standards Act, does little to address this problem; when that law was drafted, the greater problem was that employers frequently demanded excessively long hours from workers.

A particular strength of this article is the way it braids workers’ voices with empirical research, creating an compelling picture of the havoc that erratic scheduling can wreak on workers’ lives. Among these harms are some that readers would probably expect—lost time with family, childcare emergencies, insufficient income—and some that might be more surprising, including the risk that workers can drop below the threshold number of work hours required for TANF and childcare subsidy benefits when they are repeatedly sent home from scheduled shifts.

What is the solution? The article points to two responses already in place for some sets of workers but far too little-known. First, collective bargaining agreements often guarantee that workers are compensated for last-minute schedule changes, though their provisions may be subject to limiting interpretations by arbitrators. Interestingly, the authors show that American CBAs are much more employer-friendly than some of their international counterparts; remarkably, Danish and German CBAs require that retail employers provide notice of 16 and 26 weeks, respectively, of workers’ schedules.

Second, some states have call-in and/or send-home pay provisions. However, the authors note a paucity of case law interpreting these provisions (especially call-in pay laws), offering a “likely explanation” that “these laws are little-used and call-in pay rights under-enforced.” But the problems with these solutions do not end there—reflecting painstaking research, the authors show that even where states have adopted both call-in and send-home pay legislation, coverage is generally spotty, exceptions are numerous, and remedies are weak. Moreover, these statutes address just-in-time scheduling by providing disincentives but do not actually ban the practice or affirmatively guarantee workers a predictable schedule or a guaranteed number of work hours. And, perversely, these laws generally apply only when workers already have something resembling an established schedule; they do not provide protections from the most egregious scheduling practices, such as requiring workers to call in early in the morning to find out if they will work later that day.

Thus, the authors suggest a handful of common-sense reforms. They include: strengthening and broadening guaranteed pay provisions in state laws and CBAs; amending the FLSA to penalize employers’ use of fluctuating schedules; adopting a DOL interpretation of “on-call time” under the FLSA that would encompass workers who are unexpectedly called into work; and strengthening current union and worker campaigns for secure schedules. Certainly some of these proposals are more likely to come to pass than others in the current political environment, but that is a feature of the article, rather than a bug: it identifies multiple levers that would have maximum impact if all pulled together, but that will still help workers when pulled individually.

Some of the growing number of states and cities that have been focused on raising their minimum wages have now also turned their attention to the problem of erratic scheduling. This article will be valuable not only to advocates, but also to legislators in search of solutions and model language. (To the latter, I particularly commend the detailed tables at the end of the article, which list each state’s call-in and send-home pay laws, and from which I learned that Connecticut is alone in specifically protecting employees of “beauty shops” from last-minute call-ins or send-homes.) In sum, this article is a remarkably timely exploration of a significant problem, and also a joy to read.

Cite as: Charlotte Garden, A Cure for Just-In-Time Scheduling, JOTWELL (May 26, 2016) (reviewing Charlotte Alexander, Anna Haley-Lock, and Nantiya Ruan, Stabilizing Low-Wage Work: Legal Remedies for Unpredictable Work Hours and Income Instability, 50 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (2015) available at SSRN),

Dismissing Discrimination

David Schraub, Dismissal (2016), available at SSRN.

In a recent article in The New York Times Magazine, sociologist Alice Goffman – author of an award-winning book that followed a group of African-American men in Philadelphia over six years – addressed accusations that her book presents an implausible account of police practices. When the magazine reporter sought corroboration from the police themselves about certain of these alleged practices, Goffman challenged the notion that “[t]he way to validate the claims in the book is by getting officials who are white men in power to corroborate them.” She continued, “The point of the book is for people who are written off and delegitimated to describe their own lives and to speak for themselves about the reality they face, and this is a reality that goes absolutely against the narratives of officials or middle-class people. So finding ‘legitimate’ people to validate the claims – it feels wrong to me on just about every level.”

In his new article, Dismissal, David Schraub takes aim at exactly the phenomenon that Goffman describes: the act of dismissal, by which “the interpretive frames proffered by [a] claimant [are portrayed] as illegitimate and the testimonial offerings of the claimant as irrational.” (p. 28.) (To be clear, neither Schraub nor this review engage with the substance of the criticisms of Goffman’s work, but rather to use her comments about corroboration and validation as a jumping-off point. Schraub does not discuss Goffman in his article.) Schraub is concerned both with courts’ dismissal of novel legal claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), and with dismissal in its broader sense, “a decision (in any deliberative context) to dispense with a proffered claim prior to considering its merits.” (p. 3.)

An act of dismissal is profound, as it communicates that the dismissed claim, and the claimant, are unworthy of even minimal substantive recognition and engagement. Dismissal thus works a different harm than a loss on the merits, which occurs at the end of a process that gives the claimant a voice and leaves open the possibility of a successful adjudication. Schraub’s thoughtful unpacking of “dismissal” and its consequences fits well into the rich existing employment discrimination literature on the variety of subtle forms that discrimination can take and the fate of the plaintiffs who seek to make such claims in court. Just as Goffman describes the deligitimation of her subjects’ narratives, these plaintiffs may find their claims deligitimated and dismissed, as the version of discrimination that they present does not square with the one accepted by courts and society as a whole. Schraub’s portrayal of courts is ultimately positive, however, as he notes that, so long as a claim “adheres to certain preset conventions,” a court must give it at least an initial hearing, creating the possibility of eventual recognition, even if that recognition only comes after many dismissals. (p. 65.)

Schraub enters this discussion by examining the way in which judges and laypeople dismiss claims of race discrimination. In Schraub’s view, the act of dismissal, whether by a judge or a layperson, is fundamentally boundary-enforcing. Courts dismiss discrimination claims that push beyond what prior courts have deemed justiciable; laypeople’s dismissals – the accusation that the speaker is “playing the race card,” for example – enforce and perpetuate “deeply ingrained understandings regarding the meaning of discrimination[.]” (p. 5.) Schraub points out that the two forms of dismissal are interrelated. When courts mark off the boundaries of legally cognizable race discrimination, they influence the popular conception of what counts as a “legitimate” claim of racism, as “people take courts to be privileged speakers in articulations of our collective moral code.” (p. 63.) Popular conceptions of race discrimination claimants as manipulative complainers may also filter into the courtroom. Here, Schraub echoes observations by scholars such as Michael Selmi, who has noted that “courts often seem mired in a belief that [race discrimination] claims are generally unmeritorious, brought by whining plaintiffs who have been given too many, not too few, breaks along the way.” Thus, dismissal is a conservative act, used to shut down claims of discrimination that deviate from what courts and society have previously deemed to be valid.

Schraub also investigates the connections between dismissal and epistemology, or the ability to “know.” He notes that the act of dismissal can cause not only practical harm – the loss of a legal claim in court – but also a dignitary loss suffered by the claimant, a fundamental discounting of the claimant’s power to perceive and communicate his or her reality. The act of dismissal attacks the “testimonial contributions” of the claimant; it elevates the dismisser’s knowledge of the situation – attenuated and second-hand – over the first-hand knowledge of the person who claims race discrimination. Similar to Goffman, who wants to preserve people’s ability “to speak for themselves about the reality they face,” Schraub finds this troubling, an act of “epistemic injustice.” He summarizes, “Whom we credit as knowers—whose contentions gain a respectful hearing and whose fail to rise above the din—is a matter of significant consequence.” (p. 3–4.)

However, Schraub redeems courts in the end. As he observes, courts may not “shunt aside” a discrimination claim “simply because it is inconvenient or uncomfortable” (p. 65); they are institutionally bound to give even boundary-pushing claims at least an initial hearing. After enough hearings, courts may come around, and the “narratives of officials or middle-class people,” in Goffman’s words, may thus expand to encompass formerly dismissable claims of race discrimination, just as those narratives now recognize once-dismissable claims of sexual harassment as justiciable. Though he does not present his work in quite this way, Schraub is thus interested in the circumstances under which legal and popular understandings of discrimination stretch to accommodate changed conditions on the ground, the moments in which new forms of discrimination are recognized by courts and society. His work provides a valuable theoretical framework for thinking about these moments of recognition, and also about the many acts of dismissal that precede them.

Cite as: Charlotte S. Alexander, Dismissing Discrimination, JOTWELL (April 27, 2016) (reviewing David Schraub, Dismissal (2016), available at SSRN),

Preferential Hiring and “Special Treatment”: It’s all Relative

Noah Zatz, Special Treatment Everywhere, Special Treatment Nowhere, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1155 (2015), available at SSRN.

This year’s law and scholarship of employment discrimination has invited critical thought, new strategies, and rethinking of traditional legal methods like never before. Among the most innovative pieces is Professor Noah Zatz’s Special Treatment Everywhere, Special Treatment Nowhere, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1155 (2015).  Zatz laments the defensive posture assumed by those on the vanguard of civil rights activism and litigation when, in his own words, “the best defense of civil rights law requires a strong offense.” (P. 1155.)

He proceeds to take issue with the notion that disparate treatment law ought to be color and status-blind, citing the law of affirmative action in particular, and noting that “rather than retreat from ‘special treatment accusations,’” those who wish to preserve and strengthen civil rights laws and protections ought to “name it and claim it,” (p. 1157) meaning confronting these accusations and keeping the law’s (and our) focus on the avoidance of disparate treatment without obsessing over whether this might necessarily invite or involve some special treatment. This eyes-on-the prize approach means endorsing proactive steps that can be taken not only by the courts, but by employers to preempt discrimination. It also means being vigilant about distinguishing legitimate, goal-advancing interventions—that many are quick to dismiss as special treatment—from “raw redistribution.” Ultimately, Professor Zatz concludes, a “[f]ailure to appreciate the remedial context” of affirmative action is precisely what will engender “reckless accusations of ‘special treatment.’” (P. 1157.)

Professor Zatz then observes that the work of trying actively to avoid the disparate treatment of employees can, itself, often be deemed special treatment. This, however, stems from a “failure to acknowledge the relevant nondiscriminatory baseline,” (p. 1158) and the restorative goals and effects of what is too often written off as discriminatory, “special” treatment or racial favoritism. Professor Zatz walks his readers through various scenarios that aim to highlight that the beneficiaries of the “special treatment” decried too readily by many are not benefiting because of their race, but because they have been discriminated against because of their race. His eloquent, well-reasoned analysis of an issue and arguments all too often glossed over in debates over affirmative action isolates and crystallizes precisely why affirmative action should not be blindly relegated to the realm of racial favoritism.

Through insightful illustrations and examples, Professor Zatz aims to isolate for his reader, and refocus his reader on, the notion of discrimination as a deviation from a desired baseline of nondiscrimination, and away from the notion of priority hiring or affirmative action as discriminatory, illicit special treatment. He is able to do this by exhorting his reader to consider the “discriminated against” status of one upon whom preferential treatment may be conferred, rather than that individual’s racial or other protected class status. In other words, the treatment is remedial, rather than illicit and suspect. As Professor Zatz puts it, “[t]he relevant baseline for evaluating the priority hiring has to be the world as it would have been without the supervisor’s initial disparate treatment, not the world created by that discrimination. If there is no better way to identify the true victim of discrimination, then either we just throw up our hands and accept the discriminatory status quo, or we modify it with imperfect tools.” (P. 1162.)

Professor Zatz also addresses some popular critiques of affirmative action, among them that to the extent that some of its beneficiaries are not actually the precise people who were unfairly deprived of employment because of their race, they are, in fact, being treated differently (preferentially) because of their race. He also addresses the critique that “innocent” members of non-discriminated-against groups, who neither engaged in nor benefited from discrimination may find themselves “displaced.”   Professor Zatz answers that while affirmative action invariably allows some undesirable results, “to dismiss this remedy for its imperfections is to apply a double standard: the possible loss (of an accurate remedy) to the worker discriminated against is valued less than the possible loss (of an inaccurate remedy) to other workers….” (P. 1163.) Using illustrative examples of his invention and from actual cases, Professor Zatz emphasizes the notion that strategically, the best thing to do when advancing or justifying a remedy that objectors term affirmative action is to “own” the term, using it to strengthen what is being accomplished, rather than backing away from the concept.

Next, Professor Zatz expands his analysis to address claims that exist beyond traditional disparate treatment. Specifically, in his attempt to stave off criticism that such claims “invit[e] or require[e] special treatment,” he refocuses his reader on “the substance of the nondiscriminatory baseline,” invoking employer liability in third party harasser claims, the accommodation mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII pregnancy disparate impact cases. (P. 1168) He notes that the imposition of liability in the former suggests that the alleged unlawful behavior “disrupts the nondiscriminatory baseline that the employer must maintain,” and that in each instance, “the special treatment accusation really functions as a stalking horse for an underlying dispute about the concept of discrimination.” (P. 1169.) He adds that the latter two share the facts that “(1) absent remedial action (“accommodation”) by their employers, individually identifiable workers face workplace harm because of their protected status, and (2) they face this harm even in the absence of disparate treatment by their employers.” (P. 1179.) In each case, his searching comparison between the principles at play in representative caselaw and the non-discrimination baseline proves insightful and illustrative of his ultimate argument that “special treatment” is not a trump card that nullifies the legitimacy of the remedy or claim against which it levied.

This piece’s careful and logical analysis highlights that which should be obvious to those too quick to dismiss affirmative action or certain remedies as just another way of discriminating against the rights of innocent third parties because of their race, sex, or other status: “Whenever we refuse to acknowledge the remedial character of employer action, these accusations emerge because remedies…are given out to those whose injury calls forth the remedy. When that injury is ignored, it mistakenly seems that the remedy was allocated based on race, sex, or disability, not based on subjection to race, sex, or disability discrimination.” (P. 1178.) (Emphasis added). He also eloquently demonstrates, through intricate examples and analysis, that race or other status consciousness is not only not tantamount to invidious discrimination, but it is often necessary to avoid or remedy invidious discrimination.

Cite as: Kerri Lynn Stone, Preferential Hiring and “Special Treatment”: It’s all Relative, JOTWELL (March 28, 2016) (reviewing Noah Zatz, Special Treatment Everywhere, Special Treatment Nowhere, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1155 (2015), available at SSRN),

Why Importing Employment Discrimination Causation Into Criminal Law is a Bad Idea

Leora F. Eisenstadt, Causation in Context, 36 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1 (2015), available at SSRN.

In Causation in Context, Professor Leora F. Eisenstadt harshly critiques Burrage v. United States, a case in which the Supreme Court imports some of its troublesome thinking on employment discrimination causation into a criminal law case. I like the article lots because it crosses two substantive areas and explains why causation, a tricky and core concept in both areas, does quite different work in each area. In the process, the article exposes the larger danger of misusing a powerful tool that judges, lawyers and law professors alike use – reasoning by analogy. Professor Eisenstadt implicitly suggests that reasoning by analogy is of little or no use if the court that is reasoning has an insufficient understanding of the underlying areas at issue and fails to recognize what makes the analogy inapt.  If a court wants to use an employment discrimination concept in a criminal law area, the court needs to understand why the concept has been used—and whether the concept has been misused—in the employment discrimination area before deploying it in the criminal law area.

In short, the article considers how the Supreme Court in Burrage imported the but-for causation principle – the notion that a factor does not cause a result if the result would have occurred in the absence of the factor – that has been become prevalent in the employment discrimination area into a criminal law case. In the process, a principle used to determine whether intentional discrimination caused an adverse job action is now used in a criminal case to determine whether the use of an illicit drug caused a victim’s death. The article discusses the Court’s mistake in finding a false equivalency between causation in criminal law and causation in employment discrimination law. The false equivalency not only triggered an inappropriate use of an employment discrimination causation standard in the criminal law case; it may trigger a broader assumption that a principle used in one area of the law can be borrowed and used in other areas of the law. That could create problems if courts import concepts from other areas of law into an already complex employment discrimination arena.

Professor Eisenstadt begins her argument with a discussion of the history of the but-for causation standard in employment discrimination law, noting that factual causation has been a major issue in employment discrimination cases at least since the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.  The Price Waterhouse Court sought to determine what “because of” meant when multiple factors appeared to cause an adverse job action. The Court’s plurality opinion ultimately determined that in Title VII intentional discrimination cases, but-for causation was not the proper causation standard when multiple causes led to an adverse job action. Rather, the Court instituted a mixed motives standard that allowed recovery if an adverse job action was caused in part by unlawful bias, though the employer could avoid all liability if it could prove it would have made the same decision anyway. Congress resolved the issue in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by codifying the motivating factor test. That test allows plaintiff to recover if unlawful bias is shown to have motivated the relevant job action, though recovery is limited if the defendant proves it would have made the same decision without use of the illegitimate factor.

Professor Eisenstadt then traces the Court’s installation of but-for causation in two recent employment discrimination mixed-motives cases.  In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, the Court decided that but-for causation is required in mixed-motives Age Discrimination in Employment Act cases, resting its decision on the absence of an explicit motivating factor test in the ADEA. Though the Price Waterhouse Court had determined that “because of” in Title VII required a mixed-motives standard, the Gross Court concluded that similar language in the ADEA triggered a but-for causation standard. A few years later, the Court in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar used the same analysis to require but-for causation in Title VII retaliation cases.

Professor Eisenstadt then discusses Burrage v. United States.  The defendant in Burrage was a heroin dealer who faced an enhanced mandatory punishment if his buyer’s death resulted from the use of the heroin the defendant sold him. As the victim had taken multiple drugs, the medical examiner could determine that the heroin use was a contributing factor in the victim’s death, but could not determine that the heroin use was a but-for cause of the death.  The jury was instructed that the heroin need only have been a contributing factor in the victim’s death. Relying in part on an analysis of but-for causation in employment discrimination cases, the Court decided that the statute at issue required but-for causation. The defendant prevailed.

Professor Eisenstadt criticizes the Court’s false equivalency of but-for causation in criminal law and employment discrimination law. After analyzing the multiple differences between how causation applies in the different areas of law, Eisenstadt concludes that the purpose of employment discrimination law is so different than the purpose of criminal law that importing an employment discrimination principle into criminal law is inappropriate. She suggests that the false equivalency could lead to the importation of principles from other areas of law into employment discrimination and notes that tort principles have already been imported into employment discrimination law.

She then describes problems that would attend importing criminal law principles, such as mens rea intent levels into employment discrimination law. Though intent is important in each area, intent serves different purposes in the two areas. For example, differing levels of criminal mens rea track differing levels of criminal culpability. That structure does not apply in the employment discrimination area.  Similarly, importing criminal law fault principles into employment discrimination law could be very problematic. Though both areas consider fault, fault in criminal law carries a moralistic edge that focuses on the character of the defendant whereas fault in the employment discrimination area merely denotes employer responsibility.

Ultimately, Professor Eisenstadt suggests: “Instead of reflexively borrowing definitional concepts across fields of law, courts deciding employment cases should be focused on the specific goals of the law at issue, the relevant parties’ interests, and the practical implications of importing the concept into employment law.” (p. 41.)

I like this article not just because the subject matter is interesting to me as a criminal law and employment discrimination law professor, but because the article speaks to multiple audiences. It speaks to students who mistakenly think that causation in one context is the same as causation in every context. It speaks to judges who act as if causation is an easily understood concept that can be plugged into multiple areas without considering context. It speaks to professors who know that causation can be chameleon-like and want to see a well-reasoned explanation of the harms that can come from treating causation as a one-size fits all concept. Most of all, I like the article because it helps break down the silos that can be created in the academy. For those who believe that criminal law and employment discrimination law have little to do with one another, this article reminds us that judges may see connections between areas that academicians may not see. If we are to speak to and with judges, we may need to come out of our silos to discuss why the concepts that apply in one area of law should not be lightly transferred to another area of law and to discuss when such transfer is appropriate. This article helps foster this process.

I am most appreciative to have another article to assign to my employment discrimination and criminal law students that will get them thinking about causation and why it is such a tricky issue both in criminal law and in employment discrimination law. I encourage you to read this article.

Cite as: Henry Chambers, Why Importing Employment Discrimination Causation Into Criminal Law is a Bad Idea, JOTWELL (February 26, 2016) (reviewing Leora F. Eisenstadt, Causation in Context, 36 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1 (2015), available at SSRN),

The History, and Worrying Contemporary Relevance, of Anti-Trust Law for Non-Traditional Worker Organization

Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2016), available at SSRN.

As someone interested both in the history of workplace law and in modern forms of worker organization, but not especially well-versed in antitrust law, I was delighted to read, and learned a lot from, Sanjukta Paul’s excellent article. The piece starts with a troubling suggestion I have not seen seriously addressed elsewhere: antitrust law could be used against workers engaged in collective action if those workers are not traditional employees: e.g., against low-wage independent contractors. After showing this is a legitimate concern, Paul provides a rich description of the history of antitrust law (including but not limited to the “labor exemption”). She then makes a convincing argument that while current antitrust law could be applied to such collective action, it should not be. While her history is ultimately aimed at a modern issue, this is not “law office history.” Indeed, her detailed discussion of the development of both antitrust and labor law (a rare combination) would be a worthwhile contribution to the historical literature by itself. Linking it to a modern question makes the piece even more valuable.

Paul starts with a vignette about a 1999 federal antitrust investigation into potential price-fixing by striking port truck drivers who were not “employees.”  This leads her to the early days of labor and antitrust. She argues that before the New Deal, courts “dominated by classicists who were concerned primarily with freedom of trade and contract, imported fundamentally hierarchical and coercive assumptions regarding workers” into the Sherman Act. (P. 2.) In so doing, the courts “relied upon status-based normative assumptions that violated their own freedom of contract principles.” (P. 2.) Worker collective action was thus presumptively illicit. The “labor exemption” the Supreme Court ultimately created in the 1940s was the exception, not the rule, and arguably might not apply to independent contractors.

But this interpretation is not required. Modern antitrust law is primarily concerned with economic efficiency (as opposed to freedom of contract), an approach that “necessarily imports a vision of the social good.” (P. 3.) Given that, antitrust policy should inquire into the “normative concerns implicated by worker organization for decent wages and working conditions.” (P. 3.) More broadly, Paul rejects the at-least-implicit assumption that workers’ right to organize should involve an exemption to be bargained for; instead, the fundamental question should be how regulation of markets interact with the regulation of labor.

The article does many things well. Paul demonstrates how the threat of antitrust liability in the 1999 trucker action and other cases inhibited the ability of contingent workers to act collectively, and how important the threat is in light of the growth of independent contractors — including low wage workers who are easily replaced. The problem is that modern antitrust law looks at “market actors” and may not distinguish between a massive corporation and a single truck driver.  In this regard, she analyzes Federal Trade Comm’n v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990), which found a Sherman Act violation when lawyers in DC collectively refused to take criminal assignments for indigent clients unless their fees were increased.

She also does an excellent job with the history of the “labor exemption,” ultimately forged in the 1940s from certain language in the Clayton Act and the Norris LaGuardia Act by the Apex Hosiery Co. and Hutcheson cases. Most interestingly, she points to a “minor strain” in Apex which Hutcheson ignored: the distinction between the labor market and the product market. While Hutcheson was a victory for labor, it removed the idea that the exemption should be based on the idea that labor is not an article of commerce; instead, it focused on “a list of exempted activities, for which no real principle” was offered. (P. 45.) This concept depended on the power and role of labor unions at the time, and later cases specifically held that independent contractors were not covered by the exemption.

Paul argues, though, that the original Sherman Act was not intended to apply to worker collective action, and further that the application of antitrust law to worker collective action rested on reasoning that older courts should not have accepted and that modern courts would not consciously accept. In the older period, theories of “freedom of contract” animated the law, yet the regulation of work was “the great exception to classicism’s clarion call of economic freedom.” (P. 21.) This was because of implicit notions about hierarchies at work; status, not contract controlled. Thus, workers, uniquely, were not permitted to compete vertically with capital by withholding their labor. After the Sherman Act, classicists argued that it would be “unfair” to apply antitrust law to capital but not labor. But this argument presupposed “the very social hierarchy that neutrally applied freedom of contract principles ought to have condemned . . . .” (P. 26.) It reflected worries that labor was already too powerful in relation to capital and simultaneously “obscured the subordination” intrinsic to contemporary laws regulating work. (P. 27.) This argument thus ascribed to workers the consequences, but not the benefits, of actual legal agency.

Notably, while in this era many union activities fell afoul of antitrust law, the business corporation in and of itself was not considered a restraint of trade.  Corporations were single entities, while unions were combinations. Paul’s discussion of the rules and analysis of antitrust cases in this era shows that they used much of the same analysis (illegal means and/or illegal ends, presumptions of intimidation) as the conspiracy cases (more familiar to labor law scholars) of this era. For Paul, though, the key is the tension of the role of workers qua workers and their role as agents of commerce.

Today’s judges would not consciously rely on status-heavy notions of workers in disallowing collective action. Yet, modern antitrust law, even with the labor exemption, inherited the older conception of the social good. The modern justification for punishing worker collective action, like the classicist one, “rests on specific normative judgments that are neither politically neutral nor self-evident.” (P. 50.) Here, Paul interrogates the shifting rules governing “price-fixing.” (P. 50.) Older rules allowed some forms of cooperative behavior, but more recent cases restrict this by holding e.g., that lack of market power is not a defense to price-fixing (hence, the result in the trial lawyers’ case).

Still, this approach is not monolithic, and alternative approaches that could favor smaller actors could be revived and adopted. Among other possibilities, a traditional exception for professionals exists that could be broadened to other types of workers. Paul also suggests certain types of worker collective action could be protected by the First Amendment. She analogizes to Claiborne Hardware, questioning distinctions between economic and political boycotts, and also harkening back to older rules that looked at the imbalance of vertical market power.

Paul makes a fascinating and persuasive argument on an important topic, one that I have not seen others make. I liked this a lot.

Cite as: Joseph Slater, The History, and Worrying Contemporary Relevance, of Anti-Trust Law for Non-Traditional Worker Organization, JOTWELL (January 29, 2016) (reviewing Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2016), available at SSRN),

Disabilities, Caregiving Responsibilities, and Employer Requirements

In workplace law, we often see groups of workers that are marginalized by their employers or fellow employees. The treatment of these employees can dramatically affect the working environment.

In her article, Mutual Marginalization: Individuals with Disabilities and Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, Nicole Buonocore Porter explores two specific groups that remain heavily stigmatized in modern society – those with caregiving responsibilities and those that have disabilities. Professor Porter highlights the connection between these employees and their treatment in the workplace. While the link between these two groups is not readily apparent, Professor Porter carefully addresses the disparate treatment of these two types of workers.

In her paper, Professor Porter discusses the “special treatment stigma” that both groups often suffer. Those with disabilities may face resentment by fellow employees when they receive work accommodations not offered to other workers. Similarly, pregnant workers often face a similar stigma, as co-workers and managers will anticipate that these employees will need special assistance. Both groups often experience discrimination in the hiring context, as employers may expect (either correctly or otherwise) that employment of these workers will raise operating costs.

As Professor Porter points out, the law extends broad protections to workers with disabilities. Under federal law, employers are required to reasonably accommodate these employees up to the point of undue hardship. The case law reveals that this statutory requirement has some actual teeth, and while often stigmatized, disabled workers still can receive favorable treatment under the law. At the same time, those workers with caregiving responsibilities do not enjoy the same types of protections. The Family and Medical Leave Act’s leave requirement applies only to larger employers, is limited to twelve weeks, and is unpaid. While the FMLA is an important first step for workers, it does not provide the same types of workplace protections afforded to those with disabilities. And Title VII does not provide any real relief for these workers. Some states and local jurisdictions have stepped in to offer additional protections, but this stigmatized group lacks significant benefits on a more broad-based level.

The parallel drawn between these two groups is revealing, and the article provides a refreshing look at this unexplored area of the law. Through her analysis, Professor Porter provides a “theoretical justification for the reasonable accommodation provision under the ADA” while arguing for a similar “accommodation mandate for workers with caregiving responsibilities.” (P. 2.) Professor Porter thus advocates for broader protections for caregivers, as this group has a substantial need for workplace accommodations. By justifying the accommodations given to workers with disabilities, Professor Porter explores why similar accommodations are needed for caregivers.

Like all of her scholarship, Professor Porter’s work expands upon important areas of the law. It draws a new connection between these two groups that are often stigmatized. And it serves as an important reminder of how federal law can effectively change the working environment for certain groups of employees. It is critical to continually reconsider the scope of these workplace protections, and to identify where the law can be more inclusive. Professor’s Porter’s work effectively hits upon all of these areas.

Cite as: Joseph Seiner, Disabilities, Caregiving Responsibilities, and Employer Requirements, JOTWELL (November 19, 2015) (reviewing Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mutual Marginalization: Individuals with Disabilities and Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 1099 (2015)),

Masculinities Theory Helps Understand Employment Discrimination and Could Help Reduce It

Ann C. McGinley, Through a Different Lens: Perspectives on Masculinity and Employment Discrimination Law (Forthcoming 2016, NYU Press)

Ann McGinley has made significant contributions to the legal literature concerning employment discrimination in general and to the social science concerning “masculinities” in particular. In many ways, this book is a culmination of a significant number of articles and a prior book of edited essays on the topic of masculinities and the law. With the new focus on issues of masculinity highlighted in the case of Miami Dolphin football player, Jonathan Martin, who quit the team because of harassment by several of his teammates, there is beginning to be greater general awareness of the multifaceted way in which various masculinity behaviors are used to harass and discriminate against women, people of color, and people perceived as failing to behave in appropriate gender roles.

More recently, there is a focus on the role of stereotypes and masculinity games that have been barriers to women becoming Hollywood directors.1 So, this forthcoming book is quite timely. It should have a significant impact on how we discuss and resolve questions arising from the role of masculinity games in employment.

The Introduction and first chapter set the background for how masculinities theory works in the context of the workplace. The role of masculinity in employment is very contextual, depending on a variety of situations where masculinity “games” are played. At bottom, despite very different social situations, these games are all about supporting the masculine feelings of the perpetrators while subordinating the victims as weak and incapable. Those contexts in which masculinities play out based on sex, of course, but also race, class and organizational hierarchies can be implicated. Chapter 1 develops in general how employment discrimination law has dealt with, and failed to deal with, the variety of contexts in which masculinity games operate to harm its victims.

Chapters 2 to 4 work out how, at a more detailed level, the law dealing with gender and sex-based harassment has dealt with the masculinities phenomenon. The author traces the strengths and weaknesses of the law in dealing with the issues raised by the social science studies of masculinities. These chapters will be of immediate interest to lawyers and judges in dealing with the issues that masculinity theory present in cases now to be resolved.

Chapters 5 to 8 put the light of careful analysis dealing with masculinities theory on the larger context of the general theories of employment discrimination law. These materials offer a significant critique of these theories in light of the findings of the social sciences, including the implicit bias studies. These studies describe the reality of how employment discrimination operates in the workplace today. The author lays out ways in which employment discrimination law can be developed in light of the social science to the end that the incidence of discrimination could be substantially reduced. Masculinities theory is illuminating as to the shortfalls of conventional employment discrimination law but also as to the potential reforms that are evidence-based and could make a real difference in how protective that law can become.

Chapter 9 returns to the practical aspect of how the social sciences, including masculinities theory, can be utilized to educate judges and juries to better achieve just results in employment discrimination litigation. It also ties back into the more theoretical chapters because it shows how well planned litigation strategies can stretch the present law to better take account of the insights offered by the masculinities social science and, perhaps, develop new ways to protect the victims of employment discrimination.

This book represents the capstone for Ann McGinley’s career developing new and important insights into how discrimination occurs in the workplace, how the law deals with it and, especially, how the law can be developed to better protect the victims of employment discrimination. We should all be eagerly awaiting its publication.

It is with great sadness that Jotwell notes the passing of Worklaw co-editor Michael J. Zimmer.

  1. See, Cara Buckley, ACLU Pushes for Inquiry Into Bias Against Female Directors, New York Times, Wednesday, May 13, 2015, C 1. []
Cite as: Michael J. Zimmer, Masculinities Theory Helps Understand Employment Discrimination and Could Help Reduce It, JOTWELL (October 21, 2015) (reviewing Ann C. McGinley, Through a Different Lens: Perspectives on Masculinity and Employment Discrimination Law (Forthcoming 2016, NYU Press)),

Michael Zimmer

Michael Zimmer

Michael Zimmer

With sadness we note the passing of Jotwell Worklaw co-editor Michael Zimmer who has died at age 72. (See his obituary.) Mike was a graduate of Marquette University and Marquette University Law School, as well as Columbia Law School, where he earned his LLM. Following a clerkship with Judge Thomas Fairchild of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and work as an associate at Foley & Larnder, Mike devoted the rest of his career to legal education. He started at the University of South Carolina before moving to Seton Hall, where he served as Associate Dean for four years. Later, in 2008, Mike moved to Loyola University Chicago’s School of Law. He was one of the most widely admired scholars in the labor and employment field and co-authored leading textbooks in both employment discrimination law and international and comparative employment law. Mike was also dedicated mentor to a generation of law students and legal scholars, who benefited from his warmth and knowledge. (See comments from his labor and employment colleagues.)

Explaining the Blurred Line Between Employment and Independent Contracting

Julia Tomassetti, The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the Collapse of the Means/Ends Distinction in Employment, 66 S.C. L. Rev. 315 (2014), available at SSRN.

As the Reporter primarily responsible for the chapter defining the employment relationship in the recently completed Restatement of Employment Law, I thought I had fully considered and taken account of the origins and various instances of judicial confusion in distinguishing employees from independent contractors. Thus, I was especially surprised to have my understanding of the confusion substantially enhanced by Julia Tomassetti’s recent conceptually deep article. Tomassetti argues that an understanding of the unusual and contradictory nature of employment contracts and their development is necessary to explain judicial confusion when defining employment, and that it is not sufficient simply to highlight the challenges posed for courts by the nontraditional work relationships in the modern economy and the many multifactor indeterminate tests that have been developed to supplement the traditional but inadequate “right to control the means and manner of work” test.

Tomassetti contends that the principal source of judicial confusion derives from the law’s presumption that the traditional master-servant relationship is incorporated into employment-at-will relationships. These relationships entail the employer’s ongoing discretionary control over the employee’s means of production, while concomitantly providing the non-indentured “free labor” servant with the leverage of a right of exit at any time. This atypical type of indefinite contract has seemed to courts different than service contracts containing work specifications even when those specifications seem to cover not only what is produced (the ends) but also how production is to be accomplished (the means). Tomassetti provides many examples of courts rejecting employment status for service relationships defined by what she terms “upfront contractual specifications” (UCS) that would entail employment status if the specifications were imposed by employers through the ongoing exercise of their contractually presumed discretionary control. The courts, viewing contracts as the products of bilateral negotiations, assert that the specifications express a bargain between businesses, regardless of how bad a bargain the terms express for the service provider.

Tomassetti’s argument has two main components: first, a historical analysis of the unusual and contradictory nature of employment contracts; and second, a demonstration of how courts have been confused by this nature when denying employee status to workers whose means of work is controlled by their contracting partners through “upfront contractual specifications”. For her historical analysis, Tomassetti, who has a doctorate in sociology as well as a law degree, draws heavily from the work of other scholars, notably the great institutional labor economist, John R. Commons, and the labor law historian, Christopher Tomlins. Tomassetti explains that employment is both a “contract between civic equals,” as is any contract, and also “a relationship between a subordinate and superior” deriving from the historical choice of the master-servant template. Relying on Commons, she stresses that employers and employees are “continuously” and “simultaneously” bargaining and producing as the employees work and the employers direct. Control through contractual specifications, rather than only through continuing bargaining, however, highlights the contract part of the relationship, and thus provides courts with a rationale for accepting the subordinate-superior relationship as one between independent “civic equals.”

Tomassetti’s article provides many examples of how courts use contractual specifications, including ones that control the means and manner of production, as justifications for denying employment status. Some of these examples are from cases challenging FedEx’s classifications of its drivers as employees despite the contractual specification of work time, compensation, routes, and work details. Other examples provide even more blatant examples of judicial confusion, with courts making assertions such as: “setting out in detail…obligations…is nothing more than the freedom of contract” that “is significantly different than the discretionary control an employer exercises daily over its employees’ conduct.” Tomassetti, moreover, notes further examples of what she terms “meso formalism” where courts reject as evidence of employment status even contractual terms that require workers to obey or cooperate with the discretionary orders of the agents of putative employers.

Tomassetti’s project is only to explain the “unintelligibility” of the law defining the employment relationship. She does not offer alternative intelligible doctrine or tests or even express views on what should determine the scope of laws protecting or securing rights for employees. She does no more than introduce the concept of “capitalist exploitation,” ascribed to both Weber and Marx, and then note that it can be based on definite contractual terms as well as on the imposition of an employer’s superior bargaining power in production.

I believe, however, that her explanation can be used to support a reformist agenda, like that embodied in the Restatement of Employment Law, to articulate more determinate doctrine that does not founder on the distinction between contractual and production control her examples highlight. The unintelligibility of legal doctrine is not inevitable, even if the misuse of the doctrine by elite-sympathetic judges is. Despite Tomassetti’s conclusions, even the inadequate means versus ends distinction, so important to the traditional doctrine, is not rendered unintelligible by its misuse by judges using contract law to protect the discretion of employers. Distinctions can be made and should be made. Some service contractual relationships, even when bargaining leverage is not equal, are less likely than others to benefit from protections fashioned for employees. At least, whether such protections should apply may require different policy balances.

Tomassetti’s unwillingness to offer a route around doctrinal confusion or the contradictions of the employment contract does not detract from her contributions in this article. The article’s unusually creative and deep analysis demanded my attention, and I think should demand that of all concerned about this increasingly important issue in employment law.

Cite as: Michael C. Harper, Explaining the Blurred Line Between Employment and Independent Contracting, JOTWELL (September 16, 2015) (reviewing Julia Tomassetti, The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the Collapse of the Means/Ends Distinction in Employment, 66 S.C. L. Rev. 315 (2014), available at SSRN),

“Otherwise Unqualified” Individual with a Disability

Michelle Travis, Disqualifying Universality Under the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act, __ Mich. St. L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2015), available at SSRN.

I have long admired Professor Michelle Travis’s work, but I was impressed all over again by her recent SSRN article, Disqualifying Universality Under the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act, to be published in the Michigan State Law Review. There’s a lot to like in her piece, and I can’t begin to capture the entire article, but I do see a theme—“hidden in plain sight”—which I’ll try to sketch out here.

Professor Travis’s overarching argument is that the qualification question has become the emerging gatekeeper for ADA claims, threatening to replace the “disability” barrier that the courts erected and that Congress demolished with passage of the ADAAA. In a nutshell, because courts are putting the burden of persuasion on the employee to establish that she is a “qualified individual,” and that qualification requires an ability to perform the “essential functions” of the job, what is “essential” is often outcome determinative for ADA plaintiffs.

She’s not the first to notice this, of course, since Professor Travis builds on the empirical work of Steve Befort and Nicole Porter. But she makes several contributions, one of which is to trace the troop movements in the qualification counterrevolution. She does this by documenting the advice peddled by management law firms and human resources organizations in reaction to the ADAAA. That’s what I mean by hidden in plain sight: we all have seen individual examples of this, but I at least had no idea on how grand a scale or how effective this movement has become. A critical strategy is to advise employers to rewrite job descriptions to throw in the kitchen sink, that is, to include all possible functions as essential, including mental, not merely physical, functions; employers were also advised to frame environmental factors (such as tolerating excessive noise or high temperatures) as essential functions. The more comprehensive the list, the more likely a disabled individual will be unable to perform one or more of the items on it. (Although hopefully the Achilles heel of this strategy is the likelihood that others operating under the same job description aren’t performing the same tasks or under the same conditions.)

A second contribution of Professor Travis is in exploring how management attorneys have pushed the courts to give deference to employer job descriptions in deciding what is—and is not—essential. And more importantly, how much deference post-ADAAA lower courts have accorded them. Although the statute itself requires a court to give “consideration” to such descriptions, it does not require deference. Indeed, as Professor Travis makes clear, deference is contrary to the thrust of the ADA. Nevertheless, the article demonstrates that that is how job descriptions are being treated across a number of cases. Speaking of making the fox the keeper of the henhouse. Again, a phenomenon that I, at least, did not appreciate until I read Disqualifying Universality.

Professor Travis even reports several decisions that basically allow the employer to define an essential function as not being disabled! This is an extreme example of confusing the function—the tasks entailed in the position—with the qualifications of the employee in question, which leads to her third point. Building again on Nicole Porter’s work, she finds that the courts are conflating the function question with both employer norms about when and where the function is to be performed and with the employee’s qualifications to perform that function.

With respect to the former, defining a job as requiring an employee’s presence at a particular time and place means that an employee who can’t work a particular schedule is unqualified, and therefore not protected by the statute—regardless of whether he could perform the tasks involved from a distance. This is not exactly news, Professor Travis having dealt with this issue at length before, but recent events make it worth flagging. I refer specifically to EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., where the en banc Sixth Circuit just reversed a panel decision that challenged the prevailing wisdom that regular attendance was an essential function for all, or almost all, jobs

But the second conflation—the tendency of the courts to mischaracterize qualification standards as job functions—is a troubling development that went largely unnoticed in the literature before Professor Travis raised it. The statute requires that qualification standards be justified as a business necessity, but Professor Travis points out that this scrutiny can be avoided if what ought to be a qualification standard is instead viewed as an essential function. She cites several examples, one being a district court decision deferring to the employer’s job description by finding that lifting 40 pounds was an essential function. Had the court proceeded correctly, lifting would have been the essential function and the employer would have had to justify the 40-pound requirement as a qualification standard for that function. Instead, the employee in question was found unqualified without requiring the employer to show that the job required lifting such weights.

I could go on. Professor Travis has equally interesting things to say about the direct threat defense (you guessed it, not posing a threat to oneself or others is an essential function) and whether it makes any sense to require a regarded as plaintiff to prove that he or she is otherwise qualified (it doesn’t, even if the statute seems to so require). But I’ve written enough to suggest that this article is well worth the read for those interested in the future of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Cite as: Charles A. Sullivan, “Otherwise Unqualified” Individual with a Disability, JOTWELL (August 4, 2015) (reviewing Michelle Travis, Disqualifying Universality Under the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act, __ Mich. St. L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2015), available at SSRN),